The US-Iraqi pact, and all the troubles it is causing

The US-Iraqi accord, which is meant to legitamise US military presence in the country after the UN mandate runs out, is exposing the many splits within Iraqi politics and the manifold difficulty in predicting the country's future. All this "Iraq is getting better rhetoric", based on headline figures of US troop and civilian casualties, completely masks our understanding of the internal political wranglings, which actually will have the greatest effect on the long term stability of Iraq and as such history's judgment of the war as a whole. The Pact is ripping apart the already fractious situation. Ayatollah Sistani, who is probably the most respected and most influential member of the Shia Ulema in Iraq and who has stayed out of politics for the last five years, has been very forceful in his opposition to the accord. He states that it is a breach of sovereignty and in the very least needs to be voted on in Parliament. It won't be. It'd wouldn't get through. He may become very exercised and issue a Fatwa against the continuing US presence. This would have a huge affect on support for the Sadrists, who aggressively oppose the Pact and US involvement in their country. It would place the Abdul-Aziz Hakim and his followers in an impossible position, hemorrhage support and greatly aggravate their Iranian backers, or pull out of the Government. If this were to take place, it could very well exacerbate the intra-Shia civil war as the Badr Brigade are pulled out of the New Iraqi Army structures and return to operating as a private Militia, fighting for control of Basra Province and terrorising Diyala Province further. This is clearly not a good situation. Indeed, the splits are not as simple as I've laid out. The Hakim party is currently supporting the Government but a senior North Baghdadi cleric and member of Parliament from his party has spoken out forcefully against the Accord. Shia politicians are, and will increasingly, try to use this as an issue to assert themselves as major players, sitting at the top table, or even as national leaders. Previously sidelined figures like Ibrahim al-Jaafari have already begun this process. The former Prime Minister, dismissed by Bush for being too week, has announced a new nationalist, cross-sectarian, political movement, marking his split with the Dawa Party he used to run. Maliki, who appeared to have played the Americans, the Hakimis and the Iranians all very well in the last six months to seize his opportunity to attack the Sadrists, whilst they appeared weak, is now looking down the barrel of a gun. The fundamental questions for him and all other major Iraqi politicians has gone unanswered: what do we want this country to look like and how do we play the Americans? Unfortunately for Iraq and the Iraqi people, no one has effectively answered this question other than the Sadrists, who are attacked on all sides for their threatening positions.

Similar questions remain for America: what do they want out of Iraq? Who would they like governing it? Currently, the actions of both the Iraqi and American leaders seem often contradictory, demonstrating a serious lack of foresight.