Pieterson, Collingwood, and objective morality

Kevin Pieterson and Paul Collingwood both tried to go reach their hundreds at Edgebaston with a six. Pieterson charged too early at got caught at deap(ish) mid on and Collingwood's shot paid off. One got to a much needed century and was almost universally applauded for a career saving innings whilst the other found himself on the receiving end of much abuse.

Now, their results were different but the shots and the intent were very similar. A couple of inches difference and Pieterson would have been hailed as a hero or Collingwood would have been decried as a reckless fool, his position in the side still under threat. The margin of error is tiny. How can we view these two shots as that different? If we wish to pick on Pieterson then we must, logically, castigate Collingwood, or we must absolve Pieterson as we do Collingwood. Otherwise, we are left in the position where only ends matter, and as so much is random and so much is down to chance, this is a very difficult position to hold.

This demonstrates a common problem with our responses to events. If you slip and drop a glass off a roof and it narrowly misses someone you don't feel like you've done anything wrong. Thank god no one was hurt but it was an accident. You slipped. If, however, your glass had brained someone then you would in all probability be racked with guilt and feel somehow at fault. Our "natural" responses are thoroughly out of kilter with our logical basis for analyzing them. We, children of the Enlightenment, have to choose between rejecting our "gut" or instinctive reaction to things or rejecting the rational basis our lives, thoughts, and actions which we hold dear. Many of us already choose rationality over instinctive xenophobia. Are we really ready to reject ideas of agency, and thus guilt too?