Resurgent Russia? - a response to Henry Shelvin

Over on his blog Henry Shelvin has written a piece about resurgent Russia. I was going to write a long comment in riposte, but I thought I might as well post it here instead.

Henry,

I believe your view of a possible resurgent Russia is overly simplistic and a poor basis for formulation of future EU policy towards out neighbour to the east. It appears that you have swallowed the standard Economist/hack cliche line on Russia. The Economist is a newspaper, not an analysis magazine. It should be treated as such. Its analysis is often proved wrong very shortly afterwards. Its news coverage, for scope and depth, is of course excellent. I'm afraid it is given too much credibility.
Let me address a few concerns (or just differences of opinion) I have with your article.
You state that Russia is embarking on a new nationalist vision of itself, suggesting, perhaps proto-fascist tendancies. You also state that this new nationalism is designed in the interest of the Siloviki who hold power. I'm afraid this view, whilst holding some grains of truth, is not very nuanced. The Putin government/regime (delete according to predjudice) does not need aggressive expansionary nationalism pitting it against the west to sustain itself. Putin is incredibly popular. This is due to agressive media control, manufacturing consent in a crude manner, but also because he is seen as having helped 'save' Russia. His country is richer, stronger, more developed, more respected, and with a brighter future now than it had 8 years ago. This is no mean feet considering the debacle of the 90s. He does not need fear the people. The Siloviki alone do not hold all the power cards, but just some of them. Lest we forget the importance of the parastatal organisations, for which the oligarchs cash is vitally important. Those oligarchs who have dollar or euro assets at present are flooding back into Russia and domestic share prices fall. This will affect the power balances in the Kremlin. How, we can not say. The Russian path in this manner is not set. Witness the vast change in tone from August, to September, to today. Russia's rhethoric in August was often terrifyingly jingoistic and aggressive. By September there was a concerted propaganda attempt and making Russia seem civilized. Now we have a decidedly new tone. We must be more open to developments and consider the possibility that the Russian government can hold two positions, two views at once. Not because of any split between Medvedev and Putin but because they can legitimately hold two views at once. The trick of the European or 'Western' co-opter is to coax out the helpful view point. A case in point is this summer's war. Putin spoke of 'regime change' in Georgia whilst guarding against a new cold war. He wanted to hang Saakashvilli, but also discuss international laws of seccession. There is a certain schizophrenia on display which is sometimes part of the Russian tactics. You only highlighted one aspect of this dual strategy. What about the new pan-European security architecture? Is that not the co-opters dream, the ultimate defence against Cold War II or WWIII? Or Medvedev's speach praising Obama and how he is "pinning his hopes on him"? He apparently wants to negotiate, at least part of the time.
As an aside, don't get freaked out when the Russians announce that they are moving some missiles around or targetting them on an Eastern European country. They've got ICBMs. It doesn't bloody matter where they are. Moving them is bluster. Its part of the strategy to keep the 'West' guessing. Likewise, targeting missiles is totally meaningless. Loads of missiles are targetted at London right now. They were five years ago, and they will be in five years time. So what? The 'West' has missiles targetted all over the place to. They've got to be pointing somewhere.
Some factual points: you write about Russian growth since the cold war but remember the collapse of the economy in the 90s. Remember 1998. Stable Russian growth is a Putin era phenomenon (how much credit he can take for that is very debatable considering commodity price levels). Russia only in 2004 returned to the same size economy it had at the end of the Cold War. This is a stunning fact that cannot be forgotten.
On the demographic crisis I'm afraid you're working off old figures. Those are based on the assumption that Russian birth rates will remain incredibly low and that the health crisis, which is shocking, will not be alleviated. Neither of these are true. The birth rate is picking up, and tackling the health crisis is one of Putin's goals as Prime Minister. When we consider these people we too often view them as only kleptomaniacal, nationalist, lunatics with no regard for their populations. This is not the case. Putin is running a country. He runs a country. He is, not in the best possible manner but at least in some manner, both diversifying the economy and beginning to come to terms with Russia's life expectancy, HIV problems, alcoholism, and child homelessness.
You speak of flashpoints in a manner which is rather deterministic. Perhaps you are correct. The Artic situation, which you point out does appear to be presenting the perfect storm for future conflict. However, Crimea may not be the flash point Luke Harding, or other Russia hacks envisage. If we view Russia's policy towards Ukraine desires it to be, in descending order one of three things: incorporated somehow into the Federation of Republics, client state, not an anti-Russian state. Incorporation of the whole State is widely unrealistic and surely not a short to medium term policy goal of the Kremlin's. Sergei Lavrov is way brighter than that. Creating a client state involves slow, careful manipulation of that country and undermining the non-client Government. Russia need not think about Crimea to do this. Look at the Orange Revolution parties fighting amongst themselves. Russian troops in Crimea, annexing it would likely force Yushchenko and Tymoshenko back together, not further apart. Ukraine is not Georgia. The Russians could have legitimately thought that the Georgia government would fall if it put troops outside of Tblisi. It did not. The Ukrainian Government would not fall if Crimea were annexed. There may be a civil war down ethnic lines, which would become a proxy war between Russian and the 'West'. This is not in Russia's interests either. Russia is not the Hilterian state. It doesn't, yet, have a millenarianism that would lead it to act like that.

In bargaining with the 'West' you talk sensibly and presciently about nuclear issues. I think it likely that Obama will sign up to the CTBT. This will be a good thing. However, the US and EU have much more bargaining power than you suggest. Oil revenues are not emboldening the Russian state. Commodity prices are tanking. The more a strategic partnership can be offered the more one side of the Russian schizophrenia will win out. This is where perception matters and Obama is important. He is seen as someone who won't fuck them out of spite, like Bush did in 2002. Obama appears an honest broker. I believe that is what Medvedev's message is about.

As an aside, I'm disturbed you put anti-terrorism as a field in which there can be great cooperation. The war on terror has allowed grievous abuses of human rights in the name of fighting Al Qaeda and I think it supremely unhealthy to use a common crackdown, legitimate or otherwise, as the basis for a renewed relationship.

The media narrative does not have to be correct. We need to put away our hack cliches and lazy thinking and actually engage with the Russian Federation. It is not the Soviet Union. It is not status quo, but it is not entirely revach-ist either. Screaming about the sins and evils of Russia will ultimately drive it further away. Russia is European. We need to let them feel accepted as partners, with common history, culture, and purpose, whilst quietly preparing for the worst.


What do you reckon?